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AS A PHYSICIST, FIRST AND FOREMOST, I ap-
proach philosophy like all empirical sciences, 
that is, as proposing models of the domain 
addressed. This means that each theory ab-
stracts from the complexities of the domain 
under study and proceeds through idealiza-
tions of the “reality” it purports to describe. 
For this reason, every account has flaws that 
arise not only from the inevitable occasional 
errors in analysis, but also from the fact that 
by design each account, being a model, omits 
certain aspects of reality that may prove to be 
important in understanding the issue under 
examination. The commentaries on my book 
bring to the fore concerns related to both 
sorts of problems described above. I am 
grateful to the commentators for their criti-
cal notes and I hope that my replies will pro-
mote debate and shed some light on the 




Alberto Voltolini’s commentary consists 
in two parts. In the first, he discusses my def-
inition of CP as it pertains to early vision and 
points out that early vision, as I construe it, 
may still be CP in Macpherson’s sense of CP-
lite. In addition, he states that he prefers 
Macpherson’s definition of CP, which allows 
for lite-CP and strong-CP. He also objects 
that my account of why the CP of late vision 
does not entail constructivism, which is 
based on the fact that the effects of cognition 
could be alleviated since early vision pre-
serves the evidence in a visual scene, does not 
cover all perceptual situations, most notably 
multistable perception. 
I have discussed elsewhere
1
 the problems 
with Macpherson’s account and I will not re-
peat them here except to explain why strong 
CP, the thesis that ordinary perceptual expe-
rience is strongly cognitively penetrable iff its 
content is roughly the same as the conceptual 
concept of certain thoughts of the cognitive 
system, is a non-starter. 
First, some of the contents of thoughts are 
in part constitutively determined by the se-
mantic relations in which they stand with the 
contents of other thoughts through the discur-
sive inferential interrelations among thoughts. 
Since no stage of perception involves discur-
sive inferences, perceptual contents do not 
stand in semantic relations to other perceptual 
SYMPOSIUM 
 
*This paper is part of Book Symposium on A. RAFTOPOULOS, Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of 
perception, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. XI, n. 3, 2020, pp. 355-419. 
(α)
Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus, P.O.BOX 20537 - 1678 Nicosia (CY) 
E-mail: araftop@ucy.ac.cy 





contents or to the contents of thoughts. In this 
sense, the relational role semantics of thoughts 
is richer than the semantics of perceptual con-
tents, in the sense that the meanings of the 
terms in thoughts exceed the confines of the 
thought-state and constitutively depend on 
other thought-contents.  
Second, even the contents of the states of 
late vision that are CP are constitutively de-
pendent on the visual input, and, also, being 
hybrid, include nonconceptual content (NCC). 
This entails that they can represent fineness of 
grain that is lacking in the conceptual represen-
tations of thoughts; they allow, for example, for 
perceptual discriminations that thoughts do 
not. Moreover, they constitutively have a visual 
phenomenal character that thoughts do not 
have; since this phenomenal character is part of 
perceptual content, perceptual contents cannot 
be, even roughly, the same as the conceptual 
content of certain thoughts. 
Do cases of multistable perception threat-
en my argument that, owing to the CP of ear-
ly vision, the epistemically harmful cognitive 
effects on late vision could in principle be al-
leviated by revisiting the iconic information 
retrieved from the visual scene by early vi-
sion, so that a viewer may be brought to see 
what another viewer experiences despite the 
fact that initially the viewer perceived a dif-
ferent percept (Voltolini calls this “perceptu-
al revision”). Voltolini says that in such cases, 
«[T]he two subjects actually face the very 
same three-dimensional scene, yet no one is 
right in grasping that scene one way or an-
other: the opposite protruding-receding 
movements that the two aspectual percep-
tions respectively mobilize are merely appar-
ent»
2
 and concludes that in the case of as-
pectual perception the evidence the subjects 
rely on, induced by their concept-dependent 
perception, cannot be dispensed with and, 
hence, one cannot bear to see the percept 
perceived by the other… perceptual revision 
is not possible. 
Let me first remind that reader that, as 
both Voltolini and I agree, in such cases, dif-
ferent percepts are formed when viewing the 
same scene because viewers organize the sce-
ne in different ways. This organization may 
affect both the interrelations among the parts 
of the multistable object or the relations of 
this object with other objects or the back-
ground. It is also true that the phenomenal 
contents of the respective experiences differ. 
Voltolini’s main point is that in such cases 
merely refocusing spatial attention cannot 
achieve perceptual revision because the at-
tention involved is not spatial attention, 
which allows the viewer to focus on another 
critical region in the figure and, thereby, see 
the alternate percept, but rather a sort of ho-
listic attention that affects what is perceived 
as a whole. In my book I acknowledge that 
other forms of attention may affect the per-
ception of multistable figures and discuss 
these effects.
3
 Just as refocusing spatial atten-
tion may make a viewer revisit some location 
within the iconic image, reorganize the im-
age, and end up forming another percept, so 
feature/object attention may make a viewer 
focus on some feature or object and reorgan-
ize the image, by, say, switching to a different 
reference frame (whether it be viewer-
centered or object-centered). The “holistic 
attention” to which Voltolini refers should be 
used to describe not a different sort of atten-
tion but the effects of the known forms of at-
tention on the perception of the whole figure, 
because, obviously, the reorganization effec-
tuated by either sort of attention affects the 
perception of the whole figure. It seems to 
me, therefore, that in the case of the multi-
stable figure, nothing precludes the possibil-
ity that viewers revisit the iconic image 
through any sort of attention and reorganize 
the image differently, switching to the alter-
nate percept.  
Finally, Voltolini claims that early vision 
may be CP in Macpherson’s sense, since early 
vision may be directly influenced by concepts 
in so far as the latter enable it to play a cer-
tain epistemic role. However, I argued in the 
book that early vision is not directly affected 
by concepts both because concepts do not 
enter the contents of the states of early vi-
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sion, and because cognition does not affect 
the epistemic role of the states of early vision. 
Since Voltolini does not offer any counterar-
guments to this diptych, merely noting that 
according to Macpherson’s conception of 
CP-lite, early vision may be CP is not a refu-
tation of my views, because the two theses 
put forth show exactly why Macpherson’s 
conception of CP-lite is false. 
The second part of Voltolini’s commen-
tary concerns a number of problems pertain-
ing to my account of late vision. First, how 
could hypotheses that have a theoretical na-
ture befitting cognition itself be entertained 
in late vision qua a perceptual stage? It is, in-
deed, a central thesis of my account that in 
late vision hypotheses are formed through 
the confluence of purely visual information 
extracted from the visual scene during early 
vision and semantic information contained 
in the cognitive states that modulate the pro-
cesses of late vision. These hypotheses con-
cern the identity of the object and are tested 
against the iconic information stored in per-
ceptual circuits. Let me first stress that in his 
reconstruction of my views, which is other-
wise perceptive, Voltolini says that such hy-
potheses are matched against the NCC 
formed (that is, the iconic information ex-
tracted) during early vision that is now 
stored in working memory. However, this is 
not my view, although this does not affect 
the rest of Voltolini’s comments. For reasons 
addressed elsewhere, I think that NCC can-
not be stored in working memory; it is 
stored, instead, either in iconic memory or in 
fragile short-term memory, which are both 
independent of attention, unlike working 
memory.
4
 Voltolini’s concern is how such 
semantically informed hypotheses, which 
have a hybrid non-propositional form having 
both perceptual demonstrative (that is, con-
textually determined) content and conceptu-
al content, could be entertained in a genuine-
ly perceptual stage, such as late vision; they 
better befit a cognitive or an imagistic stage. 
A further concern, which Voltolini intends to 
relate to the previous one, although, unfor-
tunately I cannot grasp the link,  is that since 
mental events in late vision, such as the hy-
potheses at issue, may affect behavior, these 
mental events cannot be purely hypothetical 
but instead must be doxastic states since do 
not affect behavior. 
With respect to the first concern, Voltoli-
ni bases his reservation on the fact that since 
hypotheses in late vision require semantic in-
formation for their construction, they are 
theoretical constructs that, first, better befit 
pure reason or imagination and, second, give 
late vision a constructivist flavor. I disagree 
with the first point and fully endorse the sec-
ond. That the formation of hypotheses relies 
in part on semantic information does not 
counteract another essential trait of them, 
namely that they are constitutively depend-
ent on perceptual context in that they still re-
tain the demonstrative component that cre-
ates a de re link with the world. As such, they 
cannot be in the realm of cognition. With re-
spect to the second point, I agree that be-
cause of its CP, late vision may engender 
constructivist concerns, which is exactly why 
the previous chapter in the book addresses 
this problem.  
As far as the second worry is concerned, 
let us consider Voltolini’s own example. 
 
Suppose that at time t, in virtue of one’s 
perception in early vision, in late vision 
one entertains the erroneous idea that 
that thing over there is a snake. This idea 
is not a hypothesis. If it were such, one 




This account is ambivalent as it can have 
at least two different readings. The “errone-
ous idea” entertained may be either a tenta-
tive hypothesis that needs to be tested (and 
which if tested, could be proved wrong if sen-
sitivity to the data was not affected by CP, or 
could be adopted despite being faulty be-
cause of CP induced insensitivity to the da-
ta), or a faulty recognitional belief, in which 
case testing would have taken place (and the 




curred). In both cases, the relevant state is 
not doxastic; it is not held by the viewer since 
it has not been appropriately tested. 
If it is a mere hypothesis, it is still possible 
that, for example, an animal who perceives a 
threating figure approach while is it about to 
drink some water might run away (better safe 
than sorry) even before the figure is recog-
nized as being such and such? If it is the out-
come of some testing and, thus, a recognition-
al belief, (suppose the figure was far away and 
the animal had some time to recognize the 
figure), the animal would have yet another 
reason to run away to avoid the figure, even if 
the recognitional belief has not been tested 
against the rest of the animal’s beliefs, or 
whatever this might entail for animals). My 
point is that hypotheses, and recognitional be-
liefs before they are judged against further ev-
idence in the space of reasons, may induce 
some behavior; thus, causing some behavior 
does not suffice to make them doxastic states. 
Voltolini, second, wonders that if early vi-
sion stores all information from the visual 
scene, two hypotheses that oppose one the 
other cannot be tested against the NCC of 
early vision but require testing against two 
different NCCs of two different episodes of 
early vision. The reason underlying his con-
cern is that 
 
Appealing to a refocusing attention […] is 
not enough. For the revision is not ac-
counted for by claiming that one has 
missed a detail in the perceived scene that 
refocusing attention may enable one to 
capture, as in a sort of Blow Up- situation. 
For once again, attention must play a 
more active role. Indeed, it order to dis-
pense with the “bad” hypothesis and pre-
serve the “good” one, one must check 
them not with one and the same NCC of 
that episode now stored in working 
memory, but with a new attention-based 
episode of early vision endowed with a 
NCC that differs from the NCC of the ep-
isode entertained before. So, to come 
back to the rope-snake case, one may rule 
out the “snake” hypothesis once one no-
tices that one is facing a ropish Gestalt (as 
constituting the NCC of a new perceptual 
episode of early vision) rather than a 
snakish Gestalt (as constituting the dif-





Let me repeat that NCC is not stored in 
working memory and also point out that 
Voltolini in the last sentence means a previ-
ous episode of early vision. The problem with 
this account is, first, the role of a “more ac-
tive attention”. We know of spatial attention, 
of object/feature-based attention, of diffuse 
attention, of transient or sustained attention, 
but what is this more active attention that is 
needed to explain what goes on when one 
views a multi-stable figure? Another problem 
is the reference to an attention-based episode 
of early vision; since Voltolini agrees with me 
that early vision is not directly affected by 
attention, what does this mean? 
Finally, why revisiting the evidence con-
tained in the NCC of the perception of the 
ambiguous figure cannot vindicate the one or 
the other competing hypotheses? This reex-
amination, as it were, of the evidential basis 
can bring to the fore different salient points 
that support the one or the other hypothesis 
and all the reexamination requires is spatial 
or feature-based attention. Early vision out-
puts an image that can be organized in dif-
ferent ways that correspond to two different 
interpretations of the ambiguous figure. I 
hasten to note that this is one of the possible 
ways the perception of the ambiguous figure 
could work. In the other cases, however, the 
same analysis holds. Early vision outputs one 
gestalt or the other because the attention that 
acted before the onset of the perceptual act 
has highlighted the crucial points in the im-
age that support one of the two interpreta-
tions. In this case, early vision outputs a rop-
ish or a snakish gestalt and not something 
neutral between the two as in the previous 
case, but the point is that revisiting this ge-
stalt and applying attention to different parts 
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of the image could change the perceived fig-
ure. So, testing against two different NCC of 
two different visual episodes is not required. 
Voltolini, thirdly, asks how could hybrid 
late vision involve a non-propositional and a 
propositional content; in particular, the 
recognitional belief that late vision outputs 
should be better viewed as a post-perceptual 
content rather than as content of a perceptu-
al stage, as late vision is supposed to be in my 
account? This time Voltolini unearths a real 
problem. It is certainly curious that late vi-
sion, which has a hybrid state containing 
both NCC and conceptual content that is not 
propositionally structured, to output at its 
final stage a recognitional belief that is prop-
ositionally structured (being propositional is 
required, I thought, for its entering into dis-
cursive inferential relations in order to be 
tested against further propositionally struc-
tured evidence so that it may become a 
judgment). How does this propositional 
structure emerge in a perceptual stage? And 
if it does not, how is the non-propositional 
recognitional belief that late vision outputs 
enter into inferential relations in cognition, 
which it certainly does. 
The book does not provide answers to 
these two questions, neither do I have them to 
provide them here. I can only say, paving the 
way to future treatment of these two pressing 
questions, that despite the fact that the NCC 
of late vision is cast in an iconic format and 
the conceptual content of late vision is digital-
ly or symbolically structured, underneath 
these two different representational formats 
there are significant similarities. 
First, concerning the iconic content of 
late vision, consider Burge’s view that per-
ception is purely iconic in that it has no sym-
bolic conventional elements in it. 
 
Like perception, these types of pre-
conceptual cognitive representation have 
the same structure as noun phrases consti-
tuted of contextual-determiner-dominated 
attributives – the structure of that F or 
those Fs. When representation occurs, the 





The NCC of the iconic representations of 
a visual scene in both late and early vision 
represents a manifold of objects, properties 
and events and one could render this repre-
sentational content in the form of a set of 
subject-predicate structures; let us call the 
subject-predicate structure the basic syntac-
tic structure R. Thus, perceptual iconic rep-
resentations have a rich semantic structure 
that is similar to a nexus of the subject-
predicate structures of cognitive representa-
tions. In other words, both propositional and 
purely iconic representations share the same 
basis syntactic structure R, except that in the 
case of perception all attributives are contex-
tually-determined-dominated. 
Second, concerning the symbolic/con-
ceptual content of late vision, nothing pre-
cludes it from being iconic. Modern discus-
sions of iconic emphasize that what makes a 
representation iconic is not its being analog 
in the traditional sense, (according to which, 
a representation is analog if it is dense, ho-
mogeneous, continuous, unit-free, comes in 
information packages), but, rather, it meets 
the condition that the structure of the repre-
sentations maps in a natural way onto the 
structure of representatum so that the se-
mantic relation in the latter are preserved in 
the former. In this sense, a representation 
can be iconic even if it contains symbols. So, 
there is the possibility that all representations 
in late vision are iconic. This can be extended 
to apply to some of the representations in 
cognition. In general, a representation being 
symbolic/conceptual does not preclude the 
possibility that it may also be iconic. 
Putting together the thesis that the same 
basic syntactic structure underlies both icon-
ic and propositionally structured representa-
tions, and the thesis that even some of the 
cognitive conceptual/symbolic representa-
tions, certainly those contained in visual 
memories, may have an iconic component, 




answer the two important questions should 
be based. I do not know the answer to them 
but I think that the scheme 
  
purely iconic representations → symbolic 
non-propositional iconic representations 
→ (through the basic syntactic structure) 
propositional iconic representations → 
propositional non-iconic representations 
(such as some of the pure, abstract, 
thoughts) 
 
might be a good starting point. 
Finally, Voltolini argues, in order for a be-
lief to be endorsed no further testing against 
the descriptive content of thoughts is needed, 
as I claim it does when I discuss the differ-
ences between occurrent beliefs and judg-
ments. Here is Voltolini’s argument: 
 
[T]he distinction between a dispositional 
and an occurrent belief […] makes no dif-
ference concerning endorsement. I may 
now consciously come to entertain an oc-
current belief that I have been entertain-
ing dispositionally, say the belief that 
Pluto is round, and yet, by means of hav-
ing allowed that belief to enter the fore of 
my consciousness, my overall behavior 
does not seem to be modified, as it should 
be if that change affected my endorse-
ment of that belief. Hence, in order for 
the belief to be endorsed, no further test 
with the descriptive content of thoughts 




I am not certain I grasp Voltolini’s point 
correctly. There seem to be two threads in his 
argument. First, he seems to object to my 
view that a recognitional belief qua a disposi-
tion to make judgments needs further testing 
against other thoughts in order to be en-
dorsed and become a judgment, which is an 
occurrent state when compared to the recog-
nitional belief that is dispositional only with 
respect to a judgment, even though the dis-
positional belief being the output of late vi-
sion is an occurrent state, too. In other 
words, Voltolini thinks that a recognitional 
belief needs no more testing in order to be-
come a judgment. This interpretation is the 
only one that renders comprehensible his last 
statement that «no further test with the de-
scriptive content of thoughts seems to be 
needed»
9
 since I discuss such tests only to 
explain the endorsement of a recognitional 
belief that becomes, thus, a judgment. How-
ever, this is obviously false; when one forms 
the recognitional belief that, in the context of 
Müller-Lyer’s illusion, the two lines are une-
qual, if one does not know that this is an illu-
sion one may form the judgment that the two 
lines are unequal, but if one knew that this is 
an illusion one would not endorse the recog-
nitional belief and would not form the rele-
vant judgment. The difference in these two 
cases comes from the testing against the 
thought/belief that this is an illusion, in the 
one case, and the lack of any counterevidence 
in the other case, which means that no 
thought/belief contradicts the recognitional 
beliefs, which, thus, passes the test and is en-
dorsed. So, an endorsement is essential to the 
distinction between a recognitional belief 
and the corresponding judgment. 
Voltolini’s “Pluto example”, however, sug-
gests another interpretation, namely that he 
considers the relation between a dispositional 
belief in the sense of an item in the “standing 
knowledge” and an occurrent state with the 
same content that I called “thought”. If this is 
correct, Voltolini’s point is that when one 
consciously entertains a thought that was 
previously held unconsciously in the “stand-
ing knowledge” reservoir, one does not en-
dorse that thought and, thus, no further test-
ing is needed, because the behavior does not 
change, as it would have had any endorse-
ment taken place. There are two problems 
with this line of thought. 
First, I do not claim that any endorsement 
is needed when a dispositional belief is acti-
vated and becomes a thought; it does simply 
enter, by being activated, into the working 
memory and becomes an item of conscious-
ness. So, I agree with Voltolini that «the dis-
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tinction between a dispositional and an oc-
current belief […] makes no difference con-
cerning endorsement»
10
 when the terms are 
interpreted in the way I have explained.  
Second, the rest of Voltolini’s argument 
contains a false premise because it is not true 
that each time an endorsement takes place 
behavior is modified, unless storing a belief in 
the data basis as true and not merely probable 
is a behavioral change, in which case, trivially, 
a behavioral change does always occur when 
an endorsement takes place. Behavior modifi-
cation is not a reliable criterion by which one 
may judge whether an endorsement has taken 
place; I may endorse upon reading a paper 
that the Universe expands according to the 
previsions of General Relativity, but it seems 
to me that it is not necessary that there will be 




Lyons raises three concerns concerning the 
nature of early vision, the notion and defini-
tion of cognitive penetrability, and the nature 
of the iconic content of the states of early vi-
sion. I start with early vision. Lyons remarks 
that as the notion of early vision is unclear in 
my book and is hard to tell what Raftopoulos 
means by early vision. Lyons detects three 
ways in which early vision may be construed; 
one by representational content, one by repre-
sentational format (early vision is iconic ra-
ther than symbolic), and one by timing (early 
vision is formed in less than 120-170 ms.). 
Lyons’ concern is that with respect to the 
first two ways my claim that early vision in-
volves iconic representations conflates two 
sorts of iconicity, one that concerns contents 
and the other formats (or representational 
vehicles). While early vision may output 
structural information in an iconic format, it 
is unlikely that a distinction based on con-
tents «will draw the line in the same place as 
a distinction that rests on format».
11
 One 
reason to doubt this is that some of the in-
formation represented in early vision, namely 
affordances, solidity, or persistence in time, 
are difficult to be thought of as iconic con-
tents since they require symbolic predicates 
or something similar. If a representation is 
iconic because there is a structural isomor-
phism (I would prefer the term “mapping”) 
such that spatial and semantic relations in 
the represented domain are preserved in the 
representation, it is hard to tell how repre-
sentations that require symbols might be 
isomorphic to affordances viewed as proper-
ties of the environment/agent system. In ad-
dition, Lyons says that there is a confusion 
between “analogicity” and “iconicity”; 
whether an iconic representation is also ana-
log depends on what one means by analog, 
and that I do not specify my stance on this 
problem.
12
 Lyons’ point is that a representa-
tion may be cast in an iconic format even if it 
contains symbol-like components (since it 
satisfies the mapping requirement) but its 
content is not purely iconic owing to the 
presence of symbols. The main problem is 
that, as Lyons correctly remarks, I do not 
specify what I mean by iconicity. It seems 
that I adopt the structural mapping view, 
but, then his employment of “iconic content” 
seems oxymoronic. 
Despite the fact that “oxymoronic” is not 
used correctly, otherwise, Lyons is perfectly 
right. In the book, I did not explain what I 
mean by iconic, and how I think of the rela-
tion between iconic contents and iconic for-
mats, in particular, whether one could have 
the one without the other. Therefore, all the 
concerns he raises are legitimate and well 
placed. The reason that I did not discuss 
these important issues is that originally the 
book was supposed to have one more chapter 
in which the problem of iconicity would have 
been addressed, but owing to size restrictions 
this chapter never made it to the publication 
process. Upon returning to the rest of the 
book where iconicity is used to explain what 
I mean by it, I discovered that the problem is 
so complicated that I would need another 
book to address it (which I am doing right 
now). I decided, thus, to rely on the intuitive 




and on the eventual knowledge of the litera-
ture (both old and new) on the reader’s part. 
As a result, the problems earmarked by Ly-
ons emerged. I will return at end of my reply 
to say a few things about iconicity. Let me 
return to early vision. 
Lyons complains that even though I close-
ly relate early vision with the timing of visual 
perceptual processes I do not give a cut-off 
number specifying the time scale of early vi-
sion and, also, that I do not explain where 
this number comes from. Lyons offers a 
fourth possible way to define early vision 
based on the work of Lamme and his re-
search team, according to whom visual per-
ceptual processes are penetrated around 150 
ms. post-stimulus owing to global recurrent 
processing (GRP). He notes that this would 
be a cogent way to understand the early vi-
sion but, unfortunately, «Raftopoulos never 
even explicitly states the numerical threshold, 
let alone ties it with Lamme».
13
 In addition, 
Lyons remarks that in my previous work I 
took a very different approach and stipulated 
a priori that early vision is whatever stage of 
early vision is cognitively encapsulated and, 
then he searched for evidence that such a 
stage exists and what its content might be. 
However, in my book I define early vision by 
a combination of content, format, and timing 
and then argue for cognitive encapsulation, 
but, unfortunately, I did not explain how 
these three conditions are interrelated to 
specify early vision. 
Instead of pinpointing the problems of Ly-
ons’ reconstruction of my work concerning 
early vision, with one exception, I will suc-
cinctly explain what I mean by early vision. 
The exception mentioned above, which is im-
portant, concerns Lyons’ remark that I do not 
even hint at Lyons’ work on local and global 
recurrent processing and its role in defining 
early vision. In chapter 3, section 2, of my 
book, I refer to Lyons’ work and to his notion 
of LRP and GRP and the significance of these 
for the cognitive encapsulation of visual pro-
cessing 16 times.
14
 In section 3.1, there are 
about 16 references to Lamme’s relevant 
work.
15
 This is important because if Lyons 
had read (or had not forgotten) these parts of 
the book, he would have found many of the 
answers to what he is looking for. Having said 
that, here is what I mean by early vision. 
It is not true that in my previous work I 
started with the stipulation that early vision 
(if it exists) is the cognitively impenetrable 
stage of visual processing and then I searched 
whether it exists. There were no a priori as-
sumptions in the beginning (remember I am 
foremost a physicist). After studying the rel-
evant literature, I was left with the strong 
impression that there is a time frame during 
which visual perception is not affected by 
semantic (cognitive) information (for exam-
ple, word-forms are detected and used well 
before the meanings of these words come in-
to effect, or cognitive signals are registered in 
visual processing areas with a significant de-
lay). Then I read Lamme’s work and his no-
tion of LRP and GRP and his construal of 
early vision, which, as I explained in my previ-
ous book Cognition and perception,
16
 I adopt-
ed. Therefore, it is a plausible empirical find-
ing and not an a priori assumption that there 
exists a stage of visual processing that is not 
affected by cognition. The time frames were 
also adopted from Lamme’s work (who offers 
the 150 ms. as the threshold for GRP). Of 
course, different research protocols, different 
subjects (many experiments were conducted 
on non-human apes whose brains are smaller 
and, thus, signal transmission is faster than in 
humans), different experimental designs, etc., 
result in different thresholds for the onset of 
cognitive effects. In my book, chapter 3, sec-
tion 4.1, I discuss such a discrepancy between 
Lamme’s work and the work of other re-
searchers who have found earlier timing on-
sets for recurrent processes. This is why I 
place the termination of early vision some-
where between 120-170 ms. and not assign a 
cut-off point. Lyons may find it deplorable, 
but this is the nature of empirical research. 
After having defined early vision in terms 
of cognitive impenetrability and having estab-
lished its relative time-frame I looked at the 
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empirical evidence concerning the kind of in-
formation that could be retrieved from a visu-
al scene within this time frame, and I came up 
with the list of the properties that Lyons men-
tions in his commentary; in the first book, I 
had left out the ensemble statistics, but I in-
cluded them in the present book. Thus, cogni-
tive impenetrability, time-frames, and content 
are inextricably interrelated in the way I ex-
plained, which is why the whole edifice would 
collapse if one could adduce evidence for GRP 
at earlier onsets, and which also explains the 
need to revisit the early vision and discuss re-
cent empirical findings that seemed to threat-
en the CI of early vision. Up to this point, 
there is nothing to tie early vision with iconici-
ty although many threads leading to that di-
rection are discernible in the account of early 
vision offered here. Ι’ll return to this problem 
at the end of my commentary. 
So even though Lyons is right that in the 
present book I do not explain how I arrived 
at the timing and the list of contents of the 
states of early vision, I did not because I 
asked the reader to consider my earlier ac-
count. As I explained in the introduction my 
main aim was to explore late vision, since my 
early vision was covered in my previous book 
and all discussions pertaining to early vision 
were restricted to addressing some new con-
cerns regarding its cognitive penetrability. 
Lyons’ comments, however, suggest that I 
should have dedicated a section to reinstat-
ing my view of early vision. 
Lyons turns next to my attempts to define 
cognitive penetrability (CP). As I explained 
in the book, my aim was to pinpoint prob-
lems of the earliest accounts of CP to avoid 
them, take their positive aspects, and synthe-
size them to arrive at a new improved defini-
tion. Lyons’ comments address some prob-
lems in the definition I proposed. 
Lyons examines, first, what I called CP re-
visited, which is a first pass in the attempt to 
define CP. Lyons remarks that the five condi-
tions for a good definition in CP revisited re-
state what is worth salvaging from older def-
initions. Although this is generally true, it 
does not apply to conditions (c) and (d). 
Condition (c) states: 
 
C (a cognitive state) affects the perceptual 
processes that lead to the formation of a 
perceptual state P in the sense that these 
processes use information contained in C. 
The information contained in C is used by 
the processes that issue P in an online 
manner, that is, it is used during the course 
of the processes underwriting P and it does 
not simply fix the values of some parame-
ters that figure in the state transformations 




That cognitive information should be 
used by the perceptual processes for CP to 





 but the elaboration 
concerning the parameters that figure in the 
equations of state transformations emanates 
from an attempt to exclude pre-cueing ef-
fects from signifying CP and this is first dis-
cussed in the book, so it is a new addition to 
the literature. The same holds for (d), but 
these are innocuous problems and I will not 
discuss them any further. 
Lyons offers CP Re-revisited as a short 
head for CP revisited; no objection here on 
my part provided that one keeps in mind the 
details of the full definition of CP. Then Ly-
ons discusses the relation between CP Re-
revisited and what I call the Epistemic Condi-
tion for CP and wonder whether the two are 
related to a conjunction or a disjunction. He 
reconstructs my view of CP as follows: 
 
CP1: a cognitive influence on perception is 
an instance of CP iff (i) the influence is di-
rect, and (ii) that influence affects the epis-




Lyons worries about two things in this 
definition. First, he thinks that the revised 
epistemic condition states necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for CP and, thus, renders 
the “directness definition” redundant.  




definition does not explain why the indirect 
cognitive effects on perception should be ex-
cluded from being cases of CP. To answer 
that, I proposed that one should augment the 
definition by including an explanation of why 
indirect cognitive effects do not constitute 
cases of CP and this entails that one should 
include the clause that cognitive effects entail 
the CP of perception if they affect the epis-
temic role of perception in grounding per-
ceptual beliefs. Underlying this is the basic 
assumption about what is at issue with CP, 
namely the worry that CP renders perceivers 
insensitive to environmental information 
since the degree of sensitivity to the data is 
inextricably linked to the epistemic role of 
perception, as I explain in the first chapter of 
the book. The reader should also note that 
Lyons’ CP1 – which is attributed to me – is, 
as I point out in the book, Marchi’s defini-
tion of CP.
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 It is not mine, however, because 
the relation between the directness condition 
and the epistemic condition is much more 
complex. Here is why. (What follows is a syn-
thesis of parts in the second chapter of the 
book, so I just repeat what I have stated ear-
lier; it is not an attempt to elaborate my 
views in answering Lyons’ comments). 
As I said, the epistemic condition is main-
ly needed to explain why indirect effects do 
not count as cases of CP. Whether cognition 
does or does not affect the epistemic role of 
some perceptual stage hinges on whether 
cognition does or does not affect directly that 
stage. This does not render the amendment 
of the definition by the epistemic condition 
redundant, because the epistemic criterion 
explains why indirect cognitive effects on 
perception do not constitute cases of CP by 
appealing to the reasons that initially gave 
rise to the problem and the ensuing discus-
sion. The epistemic condition provides a 
pragmatic justification for the epistemologi-
cal decision to exclude some cognitive effects 
cases of CP. Whether a cognitive effect is di-
rect or indirect has consequences for the way 
it epistemically affects perception or a stage 
of it, consequences that have a value that can 
be pragmatically cashed out in the given dia-
lectic context. Thus, the relationship between 
the directness condition, which views CP as a 
direct cognitive effect on perception, and the 
epistemic condition, which relates CP with 
the repercussions of the cognitive effect for 
the epistemic status of perception is intricate. 
Let us put this as follows: CDAP (Cognition 
Directly Affects Perception)CP. Thus, the 
directness condition constitutes a sufficient 
condition for CP. Does it hold that if a pro-
cess is CP then it is directly affected by cogni-
tion CPCD. Could indirect cognitive ef-
fects render a perceptual process CP? If they 
did, the necessary part does not hold, which 
means that the directness condition is not 
sufficient and necessary for CP.  
This is where the epistemic criterion plays 
its role. If cognition either downgrades or 
enhances its role, a stage of perception is CP. 
As a lemma, cognitive influences on a stage 
of perception that do not affect in any way its 
epistemic role are not cases of CP. This ex-
cludes indirect cognitive effects on a percep-
tual stage from entailing CP and allows us to 
hold that CPCDAP (the necessary part of 
the extended directness condition). It follows 
that the extended directness condition con-
joined with the revised epistemic condition 
yield a sufficient and necessary condition for 
CP. Things are intricate because, ultimately, 
the fact that the indirect cognitive effects are 
easily alleviated, which is why they should 
not be deemed to be cases of CP, stems from 
their being indirect effects that as such do 
not affect perceptual processing itself. It 
turns out that the directness condition entails 
a pragmatic property, namely, that the epis-
temic consequences of the indirect cognitive 
effects could easily be alleviated, which when 
used in the context of the dialectic surround-
ing CP has an epistemological consequence, 
that is, that they do not entail the CP of the 
perceptual stage.  
Thus, it is not true that the epistemic 
condition renders the directness definition of 
CP redundant. It supplements it by showing 
why it the directness condition is also a nec-
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essary condition for CP; this is the first sense 
in which the epistemic condition is second-
ary. It is secondary, second, because it can be 
used to determine whether a cognitive influ-
ence on a perceptual stage is CP (recall that it 
hinges on whether the cognitive effects are 
tractable) only on account of the directness 
or indirectness of the cognitive effects be-
cause the cognitive effects are tractable only 
to the extent that they are indirect. Perhaps 
Lyons is right that things would be easier for 
me, and would surely better differentiate my 
views from those of Stokes or Marchi’s, had I 
used the epistemic considerations as motiva-
tion for a definition of CP rather than as a 
constitutive part of it because then the rela-
tionship between the two would be easier to 
grasp. Besides, the fact that I invoke the 
pragmatic role of the epistemic condition in 
the dialectic of the discussions about CP 
seems to reinforce Lyons’ suggestion that it 
would better to talk of an epistemic motiva-
tion rather than of an epistemic condition. 
The problem with this line of thought is 
that there seems to be some sort of a boot-
strapping relation between the demand that 
CP occurs when cognition affects perception 
directly, and the demand that CP occurs 
when cognition affects the epistemic role of 
perception. It is true that a cognitive effect 
on early vision does not threaten the epis-
temic role of early vision because cognition 
does not intervene in the process of retrieval 
of information from the environment and, 
thus, does not diminish the sensitivity of early 
vision to the environment because early vision 
does not use any cognitive information while 
it retrieves information from a visual scene. It 
follows that the epistemic role of early vision 
is unaffected by cognition because early vision 
is not directly affected by cognition since any 
cognitive effects on it are indirect, as I argue in 
the book. But one might wonder why the indi-
rect cognitive effects do not entail that early 
vision is CP and the answer to this is that by 
being indirect they do not affect the epistemic 
role of early vision and the discussion con-
cerning CP is philosophically interesting, as 
many philosophers have argued, only if the 
cognitive effects on perception undermine its 
epistemic role in grounding or justifying per-
ceptual beliefs. 
Second, Lyons worries about the useful-
ness of adding an epistemic parameter in dis-
cussions of CP. As Lyons remarks,
22
 surely we 
want to understand neurocognitive phenom-
ena like CP in a purely naturalistic way that, 
as such, does not involve any epistemology. 
He does not explain the “surely” and so I 
cannot discuss his motivation for taking this 
stance; I can only say that I disagree since I 
do not think that CP is a purely neurocogni-
tive phenomenon (or a set of such phenome-
na). Neuroscientists can examine the timing 
and loci of cognitive effects on visual percep-
tion, the role of sustained (endogenous) at-
tention, etc. As I explain in the book, howev-
er, discussion on CP started when philoso-
phers attempted to examine the repercus-
sions of such effects for the epistemic role of 
perception both in scientific practice and in 
everyday visual interactions with the world. 
It follows, I think, that any discussion on CP 
should be sensitive to this motive. 
In my view, the more interesting part of 
Lyons’ commentary is his discussion of the 
directness condition that is the cornerstone 
of my account of CP. Lyons’ comments are 
insightful and give me the opportunity to de-
velop further my views. Lyons’ claims that by 
“directness” of cognitive effects on percep-
tion I have three different things in mind. 
These are: 
 
(a) affecting perceptual processes, as opposed 
to pre-perceptual, or post-perceptual pro-
cesses; 
(b) affecting how the inputs are processed, 
rather than which inputs get processed; 
(c) affecting processing “in an online manner” 
coming into play after that processing has 




The first, indeed, was never meant to de-
fine or even entail directness; a perceptual 




by cognition and, thus the distinction between 
perceptual and pre- or post-perceptual is or-
thogonal to the direct/indirect cognitive ef-
fects on perception.  
It is striking that Lyons thinks that I have 
offered (a) as related to the “directness” con-
dition, which it is not, and leaves out a 
straightforward account of “directness” 
which permeates the whole book, namely 
that a cognitive effect on perception is direct 
iff the relevant perceptual processes draw on 
the affecting cognitive state as an infor-
mation resource. Late vision, for example, is 
CP because it is directly affected by cognitive 
states since the perceptual processes use cog-
nitive contents as an informational resource. 
In this way, the cognitive effects influence 
perceptual processing by altering the state 
transformations of which the processes con-
sist. So, this view of “directness” is directly 
connected to Lyons’ (b). 
Lyons’ glossing of the second “meaning” is 
useful because it captures what I mean by 
claiming that if a cognitive effect changes the 
parameters or initial conditions of the state 
transformation equations this does not entail 
CP because the equations themselves remain 
unchanged. This is equivalent to saying that 
the information included in the affecting 
cognitive states does not modify the state 
transformations. Lyons’ reconstruction of my 
thesis is correct, (with the exception of  the 
fact that he does mention the information 
resource condition as an indispensable ingre-
dient of my account of “directness”) since the 
fact that the transformation equations re-
main unchanged means that the input-
output mapping remains the same; the func-
tion from inputs to outputs is the same. At 
the same time, when the initial conditions 
change the input may change when the pa-
rameters are related to early perceptual fil-
ters; in this sense, they act as a “filter” that 
“selects” the information for downstream 
processing, which may itself be impervious to 
cognitive influence. These parameters can be 
construed as the attentional parameters that 
weight the effect of sensory signals, as they 
are postulated in computational models of 
perceptual attention.  
Lyons thinks that (b)-directness is at best a 
metaphor standing for changes in spatial atten-
tion are like changes in inputs. Here is why: 
 
[I]n the perceptual case, this distinction 
between difference in processing and dif-
ference in inputs is supposed to do real 
work. It’s supposed to rule out standard 
Necker-cube-type shifts of covert spatial 
attention from counting as direct (and 
thus cognitively penetrating) influences 
on early vision. But we know that unat-
tended stimuli are often still processed to 
some extent, so it’s not literally true that 
they no longer serve as inputs. One could 
insist that “inputs” that don’t win the 
competition weren’t inputs after all, since 
they don’t determine the output, but this 
would obliterate the distinction between 
output-affecting changes in processing 




Notice, first, that the “metaphor” charge 
is not entailed or even hinted to by the ex-
ample Lyons discusses. Be that as it may, let 
us examine first this example. It is indeed 
true that the directness condition is supposed 
to rule out (among other things) ambiguous-
figures cases like the Necker-cube by suggest-
ing that the perceptual shift is the result of 
covert spatial attention refocusing. This refo-
cusing changes the structure of the image and, 
thus, amounts to a change in the input that 
will be processed (which is why is not a direct 
effect on perception per (b)-directness). Note 
that Lyons does not object to this (he could 
not even if he wanted to, as the empirical ev-
idence is overwhelming and the only disa-
greements that exist concern what part of the 
image or attribute of the image is the focus of 
spatial attention). Lyons’ objection stems 
from the fact that attention by itself does not 
determine fully which inputs will be pro-
cessed because unattended stimuli are pro-
cessed too and, thus, they are also inputs. It 
follows that (b)-directness does not do an ad-
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equate job in discriminating between effects 
that determine which inputs are processed 
and effects that change the state transfor-
mations because it cannot discriminate be-
tween which inputs are processed and which 
are not (remember unattended inputs can be 
processed too). 
Lyons refers to “implicit perception” 
which is much discussed in perception sci-
ence and which I also extensively discussed in 
the second chapter of my previous book Cog-
nition and perception. There is, in fact, strong 
evidence that unattended stimuli are pro-
cessed at various levels, including semantic 
processing as well. The problem with Lyons’ 
account is that the discussion of the pro-
cessing of these unattended stimuli cannot 
bear on CP because the implicit perceptual 
processing seems to be automatic and inde-
pendent of any cognitive influences (similarly 
to the on-line processing along the dorsal 
stream that is not affected by any cognitive 
factors). Rensink
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 goes as far as calling im-
plicit perception “sensing”, which is CI, and 
not perception. It follows that even though 
attention does not exhaust the list of inputs 
that get processed, the processing of the in-
puts that are left out is CI. Thus, (b)-
directness does the job of distinguishing be-
tween CP and CI in terms of directness well.  
Another objection to Lyons’ account of 
my work is that Lyons writes as if I discuss 
only the repercussions of spatial attention for 
CP. This is not true, as my account also co-
vers object-feature-centered attention and 
this applies to the treatment of pre-cueing 
cases as well. This will prove significant when 
I address Lyons’ worries concerning pre-
cueing that mark his discussion of (c)-
directness, to which I turn. 
Lyons argues, first, that (c)-directness 
conjoined with (b)-directness define “direct-
ness”. I think he is wrong, at least in the sense 
that this was not my intention. I think that 
(b) and (c) draw the same distinction; they 
are different in that they emphasize different 
facets of the same phenomenon. If a cogni-
tive effect does not alter the functions per-
formed by perceptual process and, thus, does 
not affect how inputs are processed (b), then 
it does not affect perception on-line; an on-
line effect means just that, namely that the 
effect affects the functioning itself of the per-
ceptual system. 
He claims, second, that (c)-directness 
does not mark an epistemically noteworthy 
distinction because it does not carve nature 
at some real joints and is used as an ad hoc 
move to preserve CI in the face of counterev-
idence coming from pre-cueing studies. Ly-
ons’ argument for this claim is two-fold. 
First, he discusses pre-cueing. It is worth re-
peating here his argument in full. I render in 
italics and number those crucial parts that I 
comment upon. 
 
The biggest challenge to this view comes 
from pre-cueing effects: subjects on the 
lookout for some object or feature exhibit 
enhanced perceptual processing for that 
object or feature. To take just one example, 
hearing a word might enhance visual pro-
cessing of that word, in a way that makes 
subjects able to see degraded letters that 
would otherwise remain invisible. Because 
this is not a matter of attending to different 
regions of the distal array, there’s no chance 
these effects can be equated with moving 
one’s eyes and thereby a violation of (b)-
directness (1). Raftopoulos responds to 
these kinds of cases by admitting that they 
involve a change of processing function (not a 
change in inputs), but this doesn’t make the 
influence direct in the relevant sense, appar-
ently because the rejiggering of the in-
put/output function happens prior to the be-
ginning of processing (2). It’s not “online” 
and thus not (c)-direct, even though it is 
(b)-direct. This is odd. It’s obvious – trivi-
al, even – that pre-perceptual effects of the 
sort that concern (a)-directness are not 
perceptual effects; but what is at issue here 
is something very different. The pre-cueing 
effects of interest are not “pre-perceptual” in 
the ((a)-directness) sense of occurring before 




mined; they’re “pre-perceptual” in the sense 
of occurring before stimulus onset (or at least 
before the processing of that stimulus is initi-
ated) (3). (a)-directness carves nature at 
some real joints, if only because those very 
joints are presupposed in the distinction 
between perceptual and pre-perceptual 
processes. But there’s no reason to think 
that (c)-directness does the same, and thus 
that it’s anything more than an ad hoc move 





(1) The claim about spatial attention is 
not part of (b)-directness but can be entailed 
by it, since a change in function changes the 
processing of input, whereas, a change in pa-
rameters changes the input to be processed. 
Lyons takes advantage of the fact that this 
sort of pre-cueing involves the interaction of 
two perceptual modalities, which I never dis-
cuss in any of my books (remember the part 
of modeling with which I started this text). 
Be that as it may, we have the following situa-
tion; an acoustic pre-cue, the sound of a word, 
enhances the visual processing of this same 
world rendering letters that would have re-
mained invisible visible. Lyons hastens to note 
that there is no spatial attention involvement 
and, thus, there is no violation of (b)-
directness. Here is where Lyons pays the price 
of completing ignoring the role of ob-
ject/feature-based attention, which figures 
predominantly in my account of pre-cueing. 
This is so because the case is a typical case in 
which object-based attention plays its role. 
Upon hearing the word, a form of the word is 
activated that is transmitted to the visual per-
ceptual circuits and this visual form guides at-
tention and completes the non-visible fea-
tures. The literature is full of models (both 
connectionist and standard interactive) of 
these processes. Thus, it is a matter of attention 
after all, which Lyons misses because he re-
stricts his account of my work to spatial atten-
tion, whereas, I explicitly and in great length 
discuss the implications of object/feature-
based attention for precueing, and I also in-
clude this form of attention in all my discus-
sions of the role of attention for CP. 
(2) Lyons claims that I admit that pre-
cueing involves a change of processing function 
and not a change in input. He cites pages (136, 
195, and 207) from my book in which I alleged-
ly do claim so. This is a serious misunderstand-
ing of my claims. On page 136, I write:  
 
This is how cognitively driven attention 
affects the activation values of the neu-
rons in the relevant neuronal assemblies. 
This boost or sharpening occurs in the 
course of perceptual processing and is not 
just an off-line increase in the baseline ac-
tivation, as is the case in pre-cueing that 
affects neuronal activations before stimu-
lus onset. Attention, by biasing the com-





But, in my account, pre-cueing typically 
involves only a change in base-line activation 
and, therefore, when I write about the way 
attention affects perceptual processing, obvi-
ously, I am not talking about pre-cueing but 
about how attention renders late vision CP 
and the rest of the discussion makes this very 
clear. What about page 195? I conclude that 
page with the remark that:  
 
[i]n the next section, I argue that the cogni-
tive effects on perception that occur 
through pre-cueing are not cases of CP be-
cause they do not affect directly early vision, 
and, also, do not also affect its epistemic 




Since I relate directness with non-
changing the input but affecting perceptual 
processes it would be a blatant discrepancy to 
have claimed that pre-cueing involves a 
change in the functions performed by the 
perceptual system and, indeed, nowhere on 
page 195 do I make such a claim. Finally, let 
us turn to page 207:  
 
Both effects of pre-cueing (by which I 
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mean spatial and object-feature based 
pre-cueing) reflect a change in back-
ground neural activity and, thus, rig-up 
perceptual processing. These effects are 
called anticipatory effects and are estab-
lished prior to viewing the stimulus. In 
this sense, they do not modulate pro-
cessing during stimulus viewing but they 
bias the process before it starts; they rig-
up, as it were, perceptual processing with-




I also emphasize that pre-cueing affects 
the preparatory or anticipatory activity of 
some neuronal assemblies but does not 
change the state transformation equations. I 
do not think that I need to add any further 
comments. 
(3) Lyons claims that the pre-cueing ef-
fects that I discuss are not “pre-perceptual” 
in the ((a)-directness) sense of occurring be-
fore inputs to the perceptual process are de-
termined; they are “pre-perceptual” in the 
sense of occurring before stimulus onset, or 
at least before the processing of that stimulus 
is initiated. I am surely missing something, 
but I do not understand the difference be-
tween “occurring before inputs” and “occur-
ring before stimulus onset”. Even if there is 
one that I cannot see, in the book I take the 
two to be synonymous. 
(4) Lyons argues that there is no reason to 
think that (c)-directness does the same as 
(a)-directness, and thus it is just an ad hoc 
move to retain impenetrability claims in the 
face of counterevidence. First, the distinction 
between on-line and off-line effects on per-
ceptual processes is a very real distinction 
that purports to capture significant differ-
ences in neuroscience. Discussions about the 
dorsal system and its interactions with the 
ventral system are ripe with this distinction. 
It is the distinction between effects on a pro-
cess that occur while the process is running 
to perform a specific function (for example, 
for the few thousands of ms. that the dorsal 
system acts automatically and without any 
intervention from the ventral system to di-
rect action) and effects on this process after 
it has ended its automatic run and is boosted 
from outside with information and re-run 
albeit in a significantly different manner (as 
where action is delayed in which case the au-
tomatic functioning of the dorsal system 
ends and information from the ventral sys-
tem pours in to direct action in collaboration 
with the dorsal system). Moreover, Lyons’s 
claim in (4) seems to be a result of the three 
highlighted previous claims, although I do 
not see a connection, since all three are dis-
credited (or so I argue), (4) does not follow 
from any true premises even if the argument 
were valid. 
Lyons also argues, second, that the on-
line/off-line distinction offered as a distinc-
tion between direct and indirect cognitive 
effects on perception, and, hence, as a 
springboard for distinguishing between CP 
and CI, fails also because it does not mark an 
important epistemic distinction. In fact, Ly-
ons thinks that even if the epistemic condi-
tion is used to mark the distinction, as indeed 
I do when I use this condition to argue why 
the indirect cognitive effects on perception 
are not cases of CP, whereas the direct effects 
are, it fails to do so.
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 Not only does it fail, 
but it also entails the opposite result, namely, 
that pre-cueing effects constitute CP, since 
pre-cueing may enhance our epistemic situa-
tion by making us more sensitive to certain 
environmental cues. Pre-cueing effects, thus, 
influence the epistemic role of perception 
and, per the epistemic condition, should be 
deemed cases of CP.  
To understand my view on this matter, let 
us revisit the argument in the book concern-
ing the role of pre-cueing in perceptual pro-
cessing and its epistemic impact on percep-
tion. I argued in chapter 3 that the effects of 
both spatial and object guided pre-cueing re-
flect a change in background neural activity 
and, thus, rig-up perceptual processing. 
These are anticipatory effects, are established 
prior to viewing the stimulus, and do not 
modulate processing during stimulus viewing 




rig-up, as it were, perceptual processing 
without affecting it on-line. I also argued that 
pre-cueing effects do not select which infor-
mation is retrieved by early vision from the 
visual scene once the visual scene has been 
determined; all information from the visual 
scene is retrieved in parallel in early vision. In 
the case of spatial pre-cueing, the anticipa-
tory effects do not determine the percept 
since pre-cueing enhances the responses of all 
neurons tuned to the attended location inde-
pendent of the neurons’ preferred stimuli and 
keeps the differential responses of the neu-
rons’ unaltered. In the case of object/feature 
pre-cueing, although the anticipatory effects 
enhance the activity of the neurons respond-
ing preferentially to the pre-cued object or 
feature increasing the likelihood that they be 
selected eventually for further processing, 
early vision still retrieves in parallel infor-
mation concerning all the objects and fea-
tures present in the visual scene and these ob-
jects are individuated independently of 
whether they are targets or non-targets. All 
information in the visual scene is included in 
the iconic image. When a hypothesis is tested 
in late vision, the evidence in the iconic im-
age can either confirm or disconfirm the hy-
pothesis. Thus, by itself, pre-cueing does not 
introduce any confirmation bias. 
If pre-cueing does not affect the infor-
mation retrieved from the visual scene in ear-
ly vision, the relevant cognitive states in-
volved do not affect the selection of the “evi-
dence” or the information against which hy-
potheses concerning object identity will be 
tested in late vision. It follows that pre-
cueing and the various cognitive effects un-
derlying it do not affect the sensitivity of ear-
ly vision to the environmental data. This 
means, I argued in the book, that pre-cueing 
does not affect the epistemic role of early vi-
sion and, hence, does not entail the CP of 
early vision. The effect discussed by Lyons is 
most notable in cases of object/feature guid-
ed pre-cueing. In chapter 4 of the book, I ad-
dress this problem and start by noting that in 
cases of feature/object pre-cueing, the in-
formation that matches the cue is highlighted 
and receives a prior boost in its attempt to 
win the attentional competition. Then, the 
hypothesis concerning the identity of the fea-
ture/object that matches the cue likely will be 
the first hypothesis to be formed and tested 
during late vision; pre-cueing facilitates the 
formation of a hypothesis concerning fea-
ture/object identity in late vision. Early vi-
sion still retrieves in parallel all the infor-
mation in the visual scene. If the facilitated 
hypothesis passes the test, pre-cueing has in-
creased the efficiency of perception. What is 
important, however, is that information in-
congruent with the favored hypothesis is in-
cluded in the evidential basis provided by 
early vision so that late vision would have the 
possibility to reject the hypothesis independ-
ent on whether it will finally do so. Thus, my 
response to Lyons’ comment is to agree with 
him about the potential improvement of a 
perceiver’s epistemic condition owing to pre-
cueing but, also and very significantly, to 
point out that this occurs in late vision. The 
epistemic condition entails that the percep-
tual stage that is responsible for the epistemic 
benefit is indeed CP but this stage is late vi-
sion and not early vision, which means that 
late vision is CP per the epistemic condition 
and not early vision. 
Lyons has some more general interesting 
things to say about the role of the epistemic 
condition for the discussion of CP that as a 
matter of course I cannot address them all 
here. He notes, correctly, that other forms of 
cognitive influences have epistemic effects,
31
 
a view that I also discuss in the book and, 
thus, that the epistemic criterion under or 
over attributes CP
32
 because cognitive effects 
are all the same irrespective of the locus of 
influence
33
 This a claim concerning CP and 
its role in philosophy that has been made by 
Lyons.
34
 Lyons argues that the locus of CP 
does not have any significant epistemic im-
portance and that CP is equally worse when 
it occurs in early vision as when it occurs in 
late vision.
35
 If the arguments put forth in the 
book are sound, the locus of CP is crucial in 
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determining the epistemic impact of CP; if 
early vision were CP, there would be no way 
to mitigate the harmful epistemic effects of 
CP, that is, the insensitivity to the data that 
CP may inflict on perception. The reason 
would be that the iconic image, the evidential 
basis used un late vision for hypotheses test-
ing would be irrevocably subject to confirma-
tion bias since information in the visual scene 
would be permanently lost and could not be 
used. 
One last problem that Lyons raises
36
 con-
cerns the tractability of cognitive effects when 
they occur indirectly, which I use to argue that 
indirect cognitive effects are tractable and, as 
such, do not threaten the epistemic role of 
perception, from which it follows, per the epis-
temic condition, that they are not cases of CP. 
Lyons agrees that my reasoning applies to spa-
tial attention (and I add feature/object-based 
attention) but not to pre-cueing. This is so be-
cause one may have voluntary control over 
where one focuses attention, but  
 
if I have an overweening fear of ducks, 
what reason is there to think you could 
simply use pre-cueing to get me to attend 
to the rabbit in the image, rather than the 
duck? What reason is there to think that 
changing what someone is anticipating or 
cognitively attending to […] is any easier 




Consider Newton’s prism experiments on 
white light that led him to infer the non-
uniformity of white light. Suppose that when 
Newton asked his critics who failed to repli-
cate his experiment to use prisms made of 
Islandic glass and that one of them refused to 
do so on account of his deep-seated fear of 
Islandic things. 
Or, consider a situation in which two sci-
entists disagree on what they see under the 
microscope and one of them asks the other to 
pay attention to what is found on the upper 
side of the image, and the other retorts that 
(s)he cannot do that because s(he) is afraid of 
the upper sides. What are the repercussions 
of these for the CP of perception? What do 
fears that create an irrationality that distorts 
the sensitivity to environmental data have to 
do with epistemology?  
I will close by returning to the problem of 
the iconic nature of perceptual states and 
their contents. I do not have the space to dis-
cuss this problem except to note that the is-
sues Lyons raises are important and insight-
ful, especially the relation between the iconic 
character of contents and states, the relation 
between iconic and analog contents, etc., 
even though I do not agree with him on all of 
them. In my new book, I attempt to address 
these and much more concerning the iconici-
ty of perception. For the time being, the 
reader can read a first attempt to deal with 
some of these problems.
38
 I will mention only 
one thing. Lyons thinks that affordances, for 
example, require symbols. This is not at all 
the received view in the relevant literature. 
Many would even argue that they do not re-
quire representations at all in order to func-
tion (the reader should consult the literature 




Marchi’s commentary impresses both by 
the depth of his reading of my book, and by 
the fine grain of the analysis of the themes he 
chooses to analyze. This means that he offers 
me the opportunity to explain in more depth 
some of the views I exposed. Marchi concen-
trates on my account and critique of Siegel’s 
views concerning the relation between atten-
tion and CP. In my rendering of Siegel’s se-
lective and responsive mode in which cogni-
tion may affect perception, both modes are 
in essence the selection of information 
through attention either from the distal sce-
ne (Siegel’s selective mode), or from the icon-
ic image, that is, the information retrieved 
from the visual scene during early vision 
(Siegel’s responsive mode). At the same time, 
Marchi correctly adds, I agree with Siegel 
that evidence handpicking from the distal 




CP. These two theses raise the following 
concern  
 
If attention also operates evidence selec-
tion from the iconic image in late vision, 
how does this differ from pre-perceptual 
evidence selection in such a way that the 





Marchi will return to this point from an-
other angle later on, but in the meantime, he 
raises another concern. In my view, the epis-
temic role of early vision is not undermined 
by the role of cognitively driven attention 
that operates before the onset of perceptual 
processing (as in the case of both spatial or 
feature/object-based pre-cueing), because 
early vision retrieves from the distal scene all 
the information that the scene contains. But, 
Marchi argues: 
 
[o]ne problem that I see here is that such 
an epistemic role may also be assigned to 
the retina, or, more radically, to the exter-
nal world itself. As long as the epistemic 
role of x is that of providing evidence for 
further deliberation or processing, distal 
stimuli in the visual scene and their retinal 
projections also perform this role, early 





This is a problem because one would not 
expect the retina or the external world to 
matter to the epistemic status of visual per-
ception. Marchi is of course correct that the 
retina could play such a role, but when one 
discusses the epistemic role of some faculty 
or capacity it goes almost without saying that 
the examined faculty or capacity yields repre-
sentations of the environment (which include 
internal states); the epistemic credentials of a 
faculty or capacity are assessed in terms of 
the epistemic success or failure of the repre-
sentations the faculty or capacity yields. The 
rings of the trees may be said in some sense 
to represent the age of the tree but they play 
no direct epistemic role (which means that 
they can be used for epistemic purposes). I 
have suggested in the book that the epistemic 
role of early vision is not undermined by in-
direct attentional effects because these ef-
fects do not undermine its sensitivity to the 
data. The retina and other mechanisms 
whose function is not described in terms of 
representations cannot be said to be sensitive 
or insensitive to the data in the way “sensitiv-
ity” is used in assessments of epistemic roles 
because sensitivity is related to the possibility 
of misrepresentation and the retina cannot 
misrepresent anything, although it may fail in 
its role due to some organic defect. 
Marchi next raises an important question 
that is worth rendering in full: 
 
in the light of the above discussion of the 
epistemic role of early vision, and of the 
way Raftopoulos thinks of selection ef-
fects (§3), the CP of late vision endorsed 
by Raftopoulos may be exposed to ana-
logue objections to those about pre-
perceptual input selection failing to quali-
fy as CP, that Raftopoulos also accepts. If 
in late vision cognition through attention 
biases perceptual processing toward an 
outcome consistent with the content of 
the cognitive states, but this happens by a 
selective sampling of the “cognitively neu-
tral” iconic image, which is the input to 
late vision delivered by early vision, how 
can such a biasing process ultimately be 
distinguished from pre-perceptual input 
selection through spatial attention? […] 
from an epistemic point of view, it seems 
that late vision is also merely selecting 
where to look, i.e. what evidence to re-
trieve from the iconic image, and if such 
cases fail to constitute CP in the case of 
spatial attention and pre-perceptual input 
selection, Raftopoulos needs to offer a 
clearer explanation of why this is not the 




This, as a matter of course, is the same con-
cern raised by Marchi in his commentary.
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Why evidence handpicking from the distal sce-
ne is not CP but evidence handpicking from 
the iconic image during late vision is CP? 
I tried to explain this in chapter 4 of the 
book and here I will attempt to explicate my 
views on this problem. The effects of cogni-
tively-driven attention on early vision being 
indirect do not affect the processing of the 
input during early vision and early vision re-
trieves from the environment all the infor-
mation that is there, even in the form of en-
semble statistics in peripheral vision. Early 
vision is, in this sense, sensitive to the envi-
ronmental data. It does not choose which 
part of the evidence to allow to get in exclud-
ing some other evidence; it allows all evi-
dence to get in and reach late vision. Early 
vision outputs this information to the “evi-
dence jury” for further use. This jury has all 
the information at its disposal and this ex-
hausts the epistemic role of early vision; how 
the jury handles this evidence concerns late 
vision and not early vision. If it chooses to 
pick information consistent with a previously 
held hypothesis and ignore recalcitrant evi-
dence against this hypothesis, this down-
grades late vision but not early vision. For 
reasons discussed in chapter 4, handpicking 
from the distal scene owing to the indirect 
cognitive effects on early vision is relatively 
easily tractable, say, by refocusing spatial or 
feature/object-based attention. This predic-
ament is tractable, albeit in a more compli-
cated manner than a simple attentional refo-
cusing; it may involve perceptual training 
and learning, for example. This is why even 
the CP of late vision does not justify relativ-
istic concerns. 
The epistemic status of late vision can be 
rescued from a previous downgrade by, say, 
revisiting the information in the iconic image 
as it stored in iconic memory or fragile short-
term memory and reexamining it. This way, 
recalcitrant information previously ignored 
can be brought forth and used to reject the 
hypothesis previously favored. For this to 
happen, however, the recalcitrant infor-
mation must be included in the iconic image 
for if for some reason this information was 
not there, late vision’s downgrade would be 
intractable since there would be no evidential 
basis to reject the favored hypothesis. This is 
where the difference between handpicking 
during early vision and handpicking during 
late vision makes its presence felt. Handpick-
ing during early vision may favor some inter-
pretation of the distal scene but all the in-
formation in the scene gets in, as it were, be-
cause early vision processing itself is not af-
fected. Handpicking during late vision is 
tractable exactly because all information in 
the visual scene is available to the jury and 
this allows the jury to revisit the evidence 
and, perhaps, change its mind. In other 
words, evidence handpicking in early vision 
is a curious sort of handpicking. Owing to 
such handpicking, some information may be 
favored in such a way that in late vision a cer-
tain hypothesis may be chosen but this hand-
picking allows all the information in the dis-
tal scene to get in. If you will, it is a hand-
picking that will show in late vision but is not 
felt in early vision. Handpicking during late 
vision is a real selection of information by 
late vision of some information at the ex-
pense of some other information that is used 
by late vision. 
Marchi’s reading of my work made me re-
alize that I should have been more careful in 
explaining the handling of the evidence by 
early and late vision and that I should have 
avoided talking of handpicking in the case of 
early vision. 
Marchi resourcefully uses the jury meta-
phor to press his argument home: 
 
One may describe both cases (my note, 
the selection of information by early and 
late vision owing to cognitive influences 
on perceptual processing) as a neutral jury 
that reaches an optimal verdict while be-
ing fed only part of the available evidence 
due to an independent biasing mecha-
nism. In this situation there is no CP be-
cause the epistemic role of the jury itself 




ence is external to the jury. It does not 
matter if it was a corrupted policeman 
(external to the tribunal) or a corrupted 
prosecutor (internal to the tribunal) who 
manipulated the evidence. Alternatively, 
one may interpret the two cases of being 
cases of a corrupted and biased jury which 
pays attention only to evidence congenial 
to its prejudice. Here both instances of se-
lection could potentially be cases of CP as 
the epistemic role of the jury is compro-
mised in both, regardless of when the neu-
tral evidence has been being gathered and 
presented. In any case, it seems to me that 
both cases deserve equal treatment when 
it comes to selection of inputs being or 
not being a case of CP. This is why refo-
cussing of attention helps mitigating the 
effects of cognitive influences in both cas-





In the first case, both early vision and late 
vision are a neutral jury that is fed only part 
of the evidence. There is no CP because the 
epistemic role of the jury itself would not be 
compromised and any cognitive influence is 
external to the jury. This description, howev-
er, does not capture the point that I tried to 
make in the book. Early vision outputs to late 
vision all the evidence in the visual scene, 
and, thus, it is not true that late vision has ac-
cess only to a part of the available evidence, 
as Marchi contends. Early vision, of course, 
has access to all the evidence too, since it is 
directly, in a de re manner, related to the vis-
ual scene, and any attentional bias does not 
affect the information processing of early vi-
sion. Late vision, owing to cognitive influ-
ences, may handpick the evidence and this 
selection and the relevant cognitive influence 
are internal to the process or jury and, hence, 
are cases of CP; in other words, late vision 
has all the evidence but mishandles it owing 
to cognitive influences. The indirect cogni-
tive effects on early vision, on the other hand, 
do not make early vision handpick the evi-
dence; everything gets in (well, almost every-
thing considering the ensemble statistics).  
In the second case Marchi describes, both 
instances of selection (that is, selection by 
early vision and selection by late vision) are 
potential cases of CP because the corrupted 
jury pays attention only to the evidence con-
firming the hypothesis conforming to its 
prejudice. In this case, it does not matter 
when the neutral evidence was gathered. 
This rendering of my views fails too to ren-
der justice to what I tried to convey. Marchi’s 
description captures what transpires in late 
vision; the evince is indeed mishandled. Not 
so in early vision. This is so because early vi-
sion retrieves all the evidence in the visual 
scene and delivers it to late vision. As I said, 
this exhausts its epistemic role. Early vision 
does not have an active role in the formation 
of the percept; the identification and categori-
zation of the objects in a visual scene are in the 
purview of late vision. This is why the cogni-
tive effects on early vision do not affect its ep-
istemic role; being indirect they do not affect 
the processes of early vision and, thus, do not 
affect its role in information gathering.  
The natural conclusion of Marchi’s astute 
comments is that if both in early vision and 
in late vision attention handpicks the evi-
dence, whether it be from the distal scene or 
the iconic image, early vision and late vision 
are both either CI or CP. This means that ep-
istemically speaking they are on the same 
boat, which seems to vindicate both Lyons’ 
and Siegel’s views.
44
 The answer to this prob-
lem is inextricably related to the considera-
tions developed in the previous paragraphs. 
For the reasons developed there, I think that 
early vision and late vision are not on equal 
footing when it comes to their epistemic role in 
perceptual processing. To put it in a nutshell, if 
early vision were directly affected by cognition 
and, thus, its information retrieving processes 
were affected and only information conform-
ing to some belief previously entertained were 
selected from the visual scene, the neglected 
information would be irrevocably lost once the 
visual scene has receded. Even when the visual 
scene is present, revisiting it would not amelio-
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rate the epistemic situation of the perceiver be-
cause early vision, affected by cognition, would 
still handpick the evidence that conforms to 
the biasing cognitive state and ignore recalci-
trant evidence. 
It follows that no evidence could discon-
firm the hypothesis favored by the biased ev-
idence and, thus, the cognitive downgrade 
would be intractable, paving the way to all 
sorts of constructivist or relativistic consid-
erations. The fact that early vision is not di-
rectly affected by cognition, which means 
that early vision is sensitive to the environ-
mental input, ensures that the epistemic 
downgrade of late vision is tractable blocking 
the way to perilous relativistic conclusions. 
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